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State v. Boston, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 98 (Dec. 31, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW:  A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BASED ON A NEW LAW 
 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considers an appeal from a district court order granting a post-conviction 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Court considered whether the holding in 
Graham2 applies when an aggregate sentence imposed against a juvenile defender convicted of 
more than one nonhomicide offense is the equivalent of a life-without-parole sentence. The 
Court held that it does.  
 
Background 
 
 In 1983, Andre Boston, who was sixteen years old at the time, was convicted of several 
crimes, for which the district court sentenced him to fourteen life sentences with the possibility 
of parole, plus a consecutive 92 years in prison. Boston appealed his conviction and the Nevada 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. In 1990, Boston filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
pursuant to NRS 177.315. The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, and the Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing. In 2011, 21 years after the 
Supreme Court issued the remittitur from his direct appeal, Boston filed a pro se post-conviction 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, claiming that his sentence constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment under Graham. The district court denied the petition without 
considering Boston’s good cause argument, and Boston appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court 
reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether Graham 
prohibits aggregate sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of 
parole and whether Graham provided good cause to excuse the procedural defects. While 
Boston’s appeal was pending, the Nevada Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 2673, which 
amended NRS 176.025 to prohibit life sentences without the possibility of parole if the offender 
was a juvenile at the time he or she committed the crime.4 A.B. 267 also adds a new subsection 
to NRS Chapter 213, which makes prisoners eligible for parole after 15 years if their sentences 
were for nonhomicide crimes committed while they were juveniles.5 Based on the new law, the 
Court issued an Order Directing Supplemental Briefing and Inviting Amicus Briefing. 
Subsequently, the State, Boston, and amici filed supplemental briefs.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court first found that Boston’s petition is procedurally barred unless Boston can 
demonstrate a good cause and actual prejudice. But the Court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
                                                     
1  By Nancy Snow. 
2  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (The Supreme Court held that a juvenile receiving a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment).  
3  See A.B. 267, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015).  
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
decision in Graham constitutes good cause to overcome the procedural bars, since Graham was 
not decided until 2010, and Boston filed his petition within one year of the decision.  
 Subsequently, the Court held that Graham prohibits aggregate sentences that constitute 
life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense committed by a juvenile. The 
Court recognized the fact that courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether the Graham 
holding prohibits sentences that in aggregate constitute the functional equivalent of life without 
the possibility of parole. The State argued that Graham holding should be read narrowly to apply 
solely to a single life sentence without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense. The 
Court disagreed, noting that there is nothing in the Graham decision that limits its holding to a 
single nonhomicide offense, and that Graham himself did not receive the specific sentence of life 
without parole.6  
 The Supreme Court reasoned that the functional-equivalent approach (prohibits aggregate 
sentences that are the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole) 
best addresses the concerns enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the culpability of 
juvenile offenders and the potential growth and maturity of such offenders.  
 The State further argued that the amendments in A.B. 267 do not include the functional-
equivalent approach. The Court disagreed, stating that the plural form of “offense” in NRS 213 
as amended by A.B. 2677 shows the Legislature’s intent to allow parole eligibility after 15 years 
when a juvenile is convicted of more than one nonhomicide offense and sentences are aggregate.  
 
Conclusion 
The Court agreed with the district court’s reasoning that Graham precludes aggregate sentences 
that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders, but vacated and remanded to the case to the district court to 
deny Boston’s petition, since the Legislature has already provided through A.B. 267 all that 
Graham requires, which is a meaningful opportunity for Boston to obtain release within his 
lifetime.   
                                                     
6  Graham received a life sentence in a jurisdiction that abolished its parole system. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 57.  
7  A.B. 267 § 3(1), 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.12135.  
